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ACCOUNTABILITY BEFORE THE FACTt
MICHAEL

R.

DIMINO, SR.*

Too often the debate concerning judicial-selection methods
is framed as a balance between "independence" and "accountability," without a serious attempt to explain what is meant by
those terms. As a result, the opposing sides in the debate focus
on anecdotes illustrating the need to protect either independence or accountability, and rarely ask whether the worst of both
worlds can be avoided by developing a system that preserves both
an opportunity for the people to influence the policy choices
made by courts and judicial freedom to decide individual cases
based on the law when the result is unpopular.
This Essay argues that such a balance is possible if we abandon the notion that "independence" requires that there be no
direct role for the public in judicial selection and that "accountability" requires that the public be able to express its disagreement
with judicial rulings by voting the offending judges out of office.
The balance suggested here has two elements.
First, judicial terms of office should be long and non-renewable, such that there are neither reelections nor reappointments.
Where judges know that their ability to stay in office depends on
how politicians or voters view their decisions, there is the potential for decisions to be made on the basis of those political calculations rather than on the merits.
Second, the initial selection of judges should be by election
for high courts and by appointment for lower courts.' Public
t On March 12, 2008, the Notre DameJournalof Law, Ethics & Public Policy
hosted a panel discussion entitled, 'Judicial Accountability: Experiments in the

States." Professor Dimino's remarks have been revised for publication.

* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law. I wish to thank
Lauren Galgano, Jessica Burke, and the rest of the Notre DameJournal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy for the invitation to participate in this symposium; Charlie

Geyh for his comments on an earlier draft; and Keely Espinar for her research
assistance.
1. Intermediate appellate courts present a quandary, for they enjoy some
of the discretion that states' highest courts have, and thus make policy in those

areas not decided by controlling precedent. On the other hand, because they
are bound by the law established by the highest courts and because their dockets are mandatory, more of their decisions will be dictated by settled law than is
the case for the highest courts. My purpose here is not to decide which side of
the line mid-level courts fall on, but rather to suggest the questions relevant to

such a determination by illustrating the reasons that elections are appropriate
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involvement in the staffing of high courts is beneficial from a
democratic perspective because of the greater discretion and policy-making authority exercised by high courts. Lower courts, by
contrast, are more often bound by settled law, and the judges on
such courts do not make policy to the extent that other courts
do. As a result, there is less need for public involvement in the
selection of lower-court judges, and such involvement may well
be a negative influence if it encourages those judges to depart
from the application of settled law.
INTRODUCTION

Choosing a method of judicial selection is about allocating
governmental decision-making authority, and as such it is an
application of political theory. But the political theories that
motivate the choice of judicial-selection systems underlay more
than just deciding between elections and appointive systems. The
question of the proper degree of insulation that the judiciary
should enjoy is fundamental to issues involving constitutional
and statutory limits on jurisdiction; to setting the number of
courts and judgeships, and allocating those courts and judgeships on the basis of geography, jurisdiction, or some other factor; to limits on the authority of courts to issue, and to ensure
compliance with, affirmative injunctions; to decisions about
courts' budgets and staffing; to limits on the speech of judges
and judicial candidates; to the removal ofjudges from office; and
indeed to the institution of judicial review itself.
Recognizing that judicial independence and accountability
are implicated throughout these areas (and others) makes clear
that it is practically impossible simply to be "for" either judicial
accountability or independence. Rather, each of us, and each
state, makes a determination as to the optimal degree of public
involvement in the judiciary. The national Constitution, for
example, establishes an appointive system that does not directly
involve the people, but-especially after the Seventeenth
Amendment established direct election of senators-provides an
opportunity for members of the public to express their views
about nominees. The Constitution also establishes "good Behaviour" tenure for all federal judges,2 and the threat of impeachment-in all likelihood the most powerful (if unwieldy) way for
for the highest courts in states and appointments are appropriate for the lowest.
My references throughout this Essay to "high" courts or "appellate" ones, therefore, should not be taken to resolve the status of the intermediate courts.
2. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
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Congress to exert its influence over judges 3-is all but a dead
letter not because of the Constitution but because of congressional practice.
Thus the national government is fairly protective of judicial
independence as to both appointments and removals, and as to
both constitutional requirements and unwritten rules. Similarly,
the Constitution gives Congress power to influence judges and
judicial decisions aside from the confirmation and impeachment
processes, but norms have developed that those powers will be
used only rarely. Congress may establish (and perhaps disestablish) 4 "inferior" federal courts.5 Congress may change the number of Justices on the Supreme Court and the number sufficient
to constitute a quorum. 6 Congress probably has the authority to
increase the pay of only those judges it likes. 7 And, Congress can
withdraw the jurisdiction of lower courts,' and make "Exceptions" to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,9 to
ensure that the courts do not consider matters that Congress
would prefer not to have adjudicated in a federal court.
With all these possible ways to interfere with judicial independence (or, stated differently, ways to encourage judicial
accountability), it is surprising that so much of our focus concerning the state systems is on judicial selection. I think the puzzle can be explained in large part by the fact that states opting
for a system of popular election uniformly permit their citizens to
re-evaluate the performance of sitting judges. Thus the threat to
judicial independence in the thirty-nine states that elect some of
their judges comes primarily not from the system of initial judi3. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) ("'Once an officer is
appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority
that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions,
obey.'" (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C.
1986))).
4. Cf Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (upholding the
Repeal Act of 1802 which eliminated judgeships); Michael W. McConnell, The
Stoy of Marbuy v. Madison: Making Defeat Look Like Victoy, in CONSTITUTIONAL

13, 20-21, 31 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("The Supreme Court of the United States
shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices,
any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.").
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges' compensation "shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office").
8. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 513 (1869).
LAW STORIES
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cial selection,1" but from the reelections that those judges are
forced to contemplate and endure if they are to remain in office.
It is therefore quite natural for advocates of greater judicial
independence to focus on judicial elections, because elections
not only involve the public directly in the choice of judges, but
because they provide a mechanism for making sitting judges fearful of the political consequences of their decisions. In combination, then, judicial elections and reelections present the dangers
to independence that jurisdiction-stripping, court-packing, etc.,
present in the federal model as well as the risks that judges will
be chosen by the unqualified, uninterested voters who care far
less about the law than about advancing their preferred policies.
But there is no reason a priori to link judicial elections to
short, renewable terms of office. Likewise, there is no reason to
think that an appointments process will be concerned solely with
the qualifications of potential judges, or that the political popularity of a judge's decisions will have no impact on his or her
future employment prospects. If we decouple initial selection
from re-selection-separating "public input" from "accountability"-we can examine judicial independence in a more sophisticated way and protect the independence values about which we
care the most while still preserving an arena for the public to
influence the policies made by the judiciary.
Judicial independence helps to keep law separate from politics. Even the most cynical legal realist would acknowledge that
law should and does constrain judges from deciding cases based
solely on their policy preferences, or the policy preferences of
their communities. If part of a judge's job is to protect minority
rights against the preferences of the majority'"'-indeed, if the
very reason we have a judiciary as one of the three branches of
government is to enable the performance of that countermajoritarian function-then requiring judges to obtain the
approval of the voters to continue in office fatally undermines
that crucial function.
10. Even states that purport to have an electoral method of initial selection often see judges selected initially by appointment because appointment is
the method used to fill vacancies. See Norman L. Greene, The Judicial Independence Through FairAppointments Act, 34 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 13 (2007) ("Virtually every state appoints some judges, whether the appointments are of interim
judges who are selected to fill unexpired terms of departing judges, initial
appointments of all judges, or something in between.").
11. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice
Model ofJudging and Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1305,
1363-65 (1997). "After all, lifetime federal judges are the ones who have
enforced the VRA, school desegregation orders, and the like." Id. at 1363.
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Yet the law is not in fact or theory completely separate from
politics, and all judges possess discretion in the performance of
their jobs that allows them to apply the law differently from the
way other judges would. A regime providing too much judicial
independence runs the risk that judges will exercise that discretion to promote their own preferred policies and in so doing subvert the democratic process.' 2 Indeed, if judges are completely
independent then they face no constraints at all, including constraints imposed by law itself. 3
In short, we seek to protect the rule of law and simultaneously avoid both pure majority rule and the rule of judges. The
remainder of this Essay seeks to defend two proposals for resolving the independence/accountability dilemma: providing for
lengthy, non-renewable terms ofjudicial office, thus substantially
decreasing reelections, which showcase the worst fears of independence advocates; and electing high-level judges but
appointing lower-level ones.
I.

ELIMINATING THE REELECTION PROBLEM

A.

Reelections' Threat to Independence

The most significant problems with judicial elections occur
not because elections are used as the initial means of choosing
judges, but because sitting judges must run in elections to retain
their jobs. The prospect of reelection, not the initial election,
gives rise to the "crocodile-in-the-bathtub" concern, according to
which judges cannot help but be aware of the possibility
that cer14
tain rulings will affect their ability to retain office.
The Framers of the Federal Constitution wisely provided
Article IIIjudges with tenure during "good Behaviour," anticipating that any system of "[p] eriodical appointments, however regu12.

See Elizabeth A. Larkin, JudicialSelection Methods: Judicial Independence

and PopularDemocracy, 79 DENV. U. L. Rrv. 65, 72 (2001) ("The trade off for
judicial independence is the risk that judges will pursue personal agendas that
are in conflict with their judicial responsibilities.").
13. See Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces ofJudicialIndependence, 14 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 861, 863 (1998) ("The question becomes, what kinds of influence do we
want judges to be independent of and what kinds do we want them to yield to?
Do we want them to be independent of things like case law? How about lower
court judges being independent of judges of a higher court?").
14. See Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987)
(quoting California Supreme CourtJustice Otto Kaus); see alsoJulian N. Eule,
Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral
Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733 (1994); Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial
Politicization,72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133 (1997).
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lated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be
fatal to their necessary independence."' 5 To the particular suggestion thatjudges have their performance evaluated in popular
elections, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 responded that if
such elections were held, "there would be too great a disposition
to consult popularity to justify a reliance that nothing would be
consulted but the Constitution and the laws." 6 Nothing, it
seems, has changed. A lengthy tenure remains "the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws."' 7
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island follow
the national government's lead and give the judges on their
courts of last resort tenure during good behavior. (Rhode
Island's judges' tenure, like that of Article III judges, is potentially for life, whereas Massachusetts and New Hampshire impose
a mandatory retirement age of seventy.) The other forty-seven
states, however, require their supreme court justices to undergo
a process of re-selection to continue in office. 8 In nine of those
states, the justices are reappointed, either by the executive, the
legislature, or, in Hawaii, by a judicial nominating commission.
Thirty-eight states re-select their supreme-court justices by election, with twenty of those states using Missouri-Plan-style retention elections, where the justice runs unopposed and voters are
asked to vote yes or no on the question whether the justice
should be retained in office.1 9
In forty-seven states, then, incumbent judges know that their
ability to keep their jobs depends on gaining the approval of
others. This is hardly a scheme calculated to ensure that judges
will apply the law; indeed, the opposite is more nearly true. Reappointments and reelections are instituted precisely so that the

incumbent judges do not stray too far from the preferences of
the reappointing authorities. From an independence perspective, it makes no difference whether the re-selection is done by
popular election or reappointment; in both cases judges are
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1961).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 465.
18.

See Am. JUDICIAL

SOC'Y, JUDICIAL

SELECTION IN THE STATES

5-12

(2007), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/udicial%20Selection
%20Charts.pdf; COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, 39 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 263-70
(Keon S. Chi et al. eds., 2007); David E. Pozen, The Irony ofJudicialElections,108
COLUM. L. REv. 265, 283 n.80 (2008).
19. See Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri's Non-Partisan Court Plan from
1942-2005, 72 Mo. L. REV. 199 (2007) (discussing the history and features of
the Missouri Plan).
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made answerable-accountable-for their decisions to an institution that is concerned with political results far more than with
legal principle.2 °
Retention elections, though they were designed to provide
some measure of independence to judges 2 1 may not accomplish
that objective well enough. A judge anticipating an impending
retention election must be careful not to anger voters or interest
groups so much that a campaign is run against his or her retention.22 Incumbent judges must also raise money in advance of a
retention election in case such a campaign is waged, and as a
result some commentators have claimed that independence is
23
sacrificed to the demands of fund-raising.
As long as judges need to fear removal from office, independence will be threatened. States need not, however, give all their
judges life tenure to accommodate this concern. States may reasonably conclude that allowing any government official to
remain in office for a lifetime would permit the original selection
of that official to have too much of a continuing effect on future
generations. As times change, it may be appropriate to re-staff
courts, as well as other branches of government, with new personnel better acquainted with modern legal theories and
perspectives.
It would be preferable, however, to accomplish this result
through setting fairly lengthy terms of office 24 and forbidding
20. Perhaps there are forty-six states in this category. Whether one counts
Hawaii depends on one's faith in the political neutrality of the members of the
judicial nominating commission. I have my doubts. See Malia Reddick, Merit
Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 732-33
(2002) (discussing the impact of politics in the selection and deliberations of
nominating commissioners).
21. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 43, 55 (2003) ("Retention elections are designed to minimize the risk of
non-retention, by stripping elections of features that might inspire voters to
become interested enough to oust incumbents."); G. Alan Tarr, Politicizingthe
Process: The New Politicsof StateJudicialElections, in BENCH

PRESS

52, 53 (Keith

J.

Bybee ed., 2007).
22. See Geyh, supra note 21, at 56-57.
23. See id. at 57.
24. See David B. Rottman et al., Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Call to Action:
Statement of the NationalSummit on ImprovingJudicialSelection 8 (2002), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/CallToActionCommentary.pdf
("States with relatively short judicial terms of office should consider increasing
the length of those terms."); Harold See, An Essay on Judicial Selection: A Brief
Histoiy, in BENCH PiEss, supra note 21, at 77, 88 ("The longer the term, the
greater the independence and the less the accountability of the judge; the
shorter the term, the greater the accountability to the retention authority and
the less the independence from that authority.").
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judges from running for multiple terms.2 5 If a judge cannot be
appointed or elected to succeed himself, then the greatest pressure to conform judicial decisions to the popular will is lessened. 26 At the same time, by forbidding the re-selection of the
same judge, turnover is ensured but the people of the state
would be free to install another judge with the same judicial philosophy, if the incumbent's is to its liking.
To be sure, lengthy terms and prohibitions on serving multiple terms do not eliminate all influences that might pressure
judges to decide cases differently from what the law requires.
Judges still may decide cases to appease their families, editorial
writers, interest groups, or their own senses of *ustice-arisk present regardless of the manner of selection.24 Judges may also
believe that their chances for future judicial office may depend
on the political acceptability of their decisions, for even in a system eliminating reelections, judges will want to run for (or be
appointed to) higher judicial office. 28 But that problem is present under any system that permits judges to move up the hierarchy. In the completely appointive federal model, Presidents will
nominate judges whose decisions have been, and are likely to be,
politically acceptable, and the Senate will apply the same criterion in evaluating those nominees.
Even in systems where nominations are made by, or filtered
through, a commission, such an incentive is present. For example, in a system where the governor must nominate judges from a
list approved by a nominating commission, and where those
nominees will then be subject to confirmation by the state senate,
judges will have to appeal to the desires of the governor and the
senate, as well as ensure that their prior behavior has not disqualified them in the eyes of the commission. Such a system may
make judges more cautious about rendering politically unpopu25. But see Rottman et al., supra note 24, at 8 ("Term limits .
are not
appropriate for judicial office.").
26. See See, supra note 24, at 88 ("Limiting a judge to a single term,
whatever its length, similarly increases independence and decreases accountability, because the judge has little incentive to please a retention authority.").
27. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 665 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing "worldly ambition" as an influence on judicial decision making).
28. See Roundtable Discussion, Is There a Threat to Judicial Independence in
the United States Today?, 26 FoRDHam URB. L.J. 7, 26 (1998) (statement of Circuit
Judge Guido Calabresi) ("If I were to identify the single greatest threat to judi-

cial independence today, it would be the fact that judges want to move up.");
Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention ofJudges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1995) (noting the influence on appointed judges of
the desire to be appointed to higher courts).
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lar decisions, 29 even as such systems are recommended as ways of
lessening the impact of politics in the judicial-selection process.
Any proposal for eliminating reelections must deal with
judges who are appointed to fill unexpired terms."0 If they are
permitted to run for office at the end of that period, the crocodile-in-the-bathtub danger is present. If they are prohibited from
running, it may be difficult to find judges who would be willing
to serve for only a portion of a single term. States may, therefore,
wish to draw a distinction based on the length of time the judge
was able to serve before the end of the term, in the same way the
Twenty-Second Amendment deals with presidential succession.3 1
Thus, if the regular term of office for an elected judge is twenty
years, judges who are appointed with, for example, fewer than
ten years remaining in the term would be permitted to run for
reelection, while judges appointed to a term of ten years or more
would be prohibited from seeking another term. Under such a
system, the current possibility forjudges to make decisions based
on their own prospects for reelection would be reduced, and yet
few potential judges would be dissuaded from accepting an
appointment to serve half of an unexpired term if the unexpired
term is sufficiently lengthy.
So while eliminating reelections will not remove every possibility that judges will consider the political consequences of their
decisions, it surely negates the political consequence of the greatest import to most elected judges.
B.

Public Involvement in InitialJudicial Selection

Without question, it is more difficult for the public to make
judges "accountable" if judges' decisions need not be defended
come election time. But those who worry about rogue judges may
29.

See

ALLAN ASHMAN

& JAMES

J.

ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT

75-77 (1974) (reporting on the influence
of politics in the deliberations of nominating commissions); JOANNE MARTIN,
MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS 20-22 (1993) (same).
30. Similar concerns are raised by recess appointments even in systems,
such as the federal one, that grant judges good-behavior tenure. Where ajudge
takes office before his or her permanent appointment has taken effect, there is
a danger that the appointing authority will consider the judge's decisions during the period of temporary service in deciding whether to appoint thejudge to
a full term, with the concomitant danger that a recess appointee will seek to
appeal to the appointing authority when deciding cases.
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 ("No person shall be elected to the
office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office
of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which
some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the
President more than once.").
SELECTION:

THE

NOMINATING PROCESS
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be given some consolation if the initial process of selecting
judges involves a frank discussion of the judicial philosophies of
the persons seeking judicial office. Public input into initial judicial selections helps ensure that judges will assume the bench
only if their general approaches to judging are consonant with
the public's belief about the proper judicial role, but does not
pressure those judges into deciding individual cases according to
public opinion. As a result, promoting public involvement in initial selection but not in the continuing evaluation of judges may
prove a workable compromise between champions of independence and accountability.
Initial selections-whether by election or appointmentpresent quite different, and less substantial, hazards to judicial
independence than do reelections and reappointments. Gone is
the crocodile-in-the-bathtub phenomenon; in its place critics of
public involvement can decry only public ignorance about the
candidates and the legal issues, as well as the concern that wouldbe judges might prejudge cases to appease powerful interests and
make their appointment more likely.
To understand the different threats to independence posed
by initial elections and reelections, one must separate what may
be called decisional accountability from prospective accountability.3" If individual judges are accountable to the public or to politicians for their decisions, then the capacity of the judiciary to
serve as a bulwark on behalf of the law against the popular will is
undermined. Decisional accountability thus seeks to extend democratic control over policy to the individual case and uses as its
means the intimidation of the individual judges who make the
decisions.
Prospective accountability seeks to correct a different perceived harm of the independent judiciary, and can achieve it by
means drastically different from the means used to impose decisional accountability on judges. Advocates of prospective
accountability understand that results in individual cases may be
32.

term. See

Fellow panelist Charles Gardner Geyh deserves credit for the latter
CHARLES GARDNER GEYM, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE

221

(2006). I acknowledge the oxymoronic quality of the term; perhaps it would be

better to speak simply in terms of prospective public influence. Beyond semantics, the idea of prospective "accountability" can be criticized as not providing
much, if any, real accountability. For someone who identifies accountability as
only oversight of decisions by incumbent judges, there is no room for compromise with those who favor decisional independence. I offer the idea of prospective accountability not as a means of achieving both independence and
accountability, but of compromising and avoiding the worst possible results
under systems providing more robust guarantees of either.
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20081

unpopular, and that the rule of law requires that the majority will
be obstructed on occasion. But accepting unpopular individual
cases is far different from accepting the imposition of public policy created by judges whose views are out of step with society."
Where judicial decisions are not dictated by the law, but instead
are the product (in whole or in part) of the judges' political or
contestable judicial philosophies, judges are making policy
through their decisions, according to the same criteria by which
legislators make it. As such, democratic principles suggest that
judicial policy-makers, like legislative ones, be subject to some
public influence.
The national government provides for the courts to be prospectively accountable in this sense by giving the political
branches the responsibility for judicial appointments, 34 but provides decisional independence by giving tenure and salary protection to individual judges. It is therefore unsurprising that
throughout our history, as many scholars have demonstrated,
presidents and congresses have shaped the law by shaping the
courts

5

33. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 236 (1987)
("We want our federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, to be independent of popular opinion when deciding the particular cases or controversies
that come before them .... But the manifold provisions of the Constitution

with which judges must deal are by no means crystal clear in their import, and
reasonable minds may differ as to which interpretation is proper. When a
vacancy occurs on the Court, it is entirely appropriate that that vacancy be filled
by the president, responsible to a national constituency, as advised by the Senate, whose members are responsible to regional constituencies.").
34. See REHNQUIST, supra note 33, at 236 ("[Ilt is .. .both normal and
desirable for presidents to attempt to pack the Court ....").Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has already stated his intention to choose his
Supreme Court nominees on the basis of the nominees' commitment to fulfilling Obama's political views through judicial interpretation of the Constitution
and laws. See Edward Whelan, Obama's Constitution: The Rhetoric and the Reality,
WKLV. STANDARD, Mar. 17, 2008, at 12, 12, available at http://weeklystandard.
com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/849oyckg.asp ("'We need somebody who's got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it's like to be a young
teenage mom, the empathy to understand what it's like to be poor or AfricanAmerican or gay or disabled or old-and that's the criterion by which I'll be
selecting my judges.'" (quoting Sen. Barack Obama)). Of course Obama is not
exceptional in his desire to achieve and entrench policy gains through the judiciary; every president has done so. Indeed, John Adams's appointments of the
midnight judges in 1801 entrenched the practice in constitutional lore because
it gave rise to Marbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. See generally, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM,JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS (5th ed. 2008); LEE EPSTEIN &JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
GIC SELECTION

(2007);

LAURENCE

H.

(2005);

CHRISTINE

L.

NEMACHECK, STRATE-

TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT

(1985); DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES (1999); Michael R. Dimino,
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Recognition of the policy-making role played by the courts
has led to an increase in the scrutiny given to judicial nominees'
(including lower-court nominees') philosophies by the Senate
and interest groups. Thus while the federal system does not use
elections to select judges, the public has become increasingly
involved in the process in a manner that may be seen as balancing the independence that judges have acquired for themselves
once they assume the bench.3 6
States should be able to achieve the same balance, and
doing so through initial elections may be an appropriate way to
do so. States may reasonably conclude, as their predecessors in
the Jacksonian era did, that elections can be a positive force in
helping the judiciary achieve independence from the political
elites who would otherwise control the appointments process."
Similarly, states may reasonably be wary of the potential influence of the organized bar and other interest groups in a system
using nominating commissions in the appointments process.
Elections do, of course, have the potential of advantaging other
interests-political bosses and candidates with name recognition
or money, for example-but they provide some opportunity for
the people to check those influences, and to do so before the
judges assume office. Retention elections, by contrast, occur after
the judges have taken the bench, thus raising problems of decisional accountability, even if they otherwise allow the public to
object to the choices made by the nominating commissions and
political officials involved in the appointments process.3 8
Without such a popular check on elites' judicial appointments, there is an increased risk that the judges will decide cases
Sr., The Worst Way of SelectingJudges-Except All the Others That Have Been Tried, 32
N. Ky. L. REv. 267, 284 (2005) ("[I]t is undeniable ... that the attitudes of the
judges forecast their decisions on the bench. And if the average voter does not

understand this confluence of legal realism and political science, one can be
sure that Presidents and Senators do." (footnotes omitted)).
36. See GEYH, supra note 32, at 171-222, 254-55.
37. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanationsfor the Rise of
the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 190, 207-19
(1993).
38. Retention elections typically do not give the public this opportunity.
Because retention elections are uncontested, there is no opponent to point to
the deficiencies of the incumbent. It is rare that interest groups will pick up the
slack, as they did in the famous 1986 California retention elections that ousted
Chief Justice Bird and her colleagues, and advocate for the defeat of judges
seeking retention. Of course, that is exactly the point of having retention elections rather than more competitive, and more democratically effective,
alternatives.
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on the basis of a philosophy not shared by most of the people. 9
The point here is not that those judges will violate the law, or
even that they will consciously shape the law consistent with their
policy preferences, but rather that judges decide cases predictably based on their judicial philosophies, and that a wide range
of outcomes is consistent with judges' obligation to decide cases
faithfully. There is a tremendous difference between a Brandeis
and a Van Devanter, between a Douglas and a Frankfurter, and
between a Brennan and a Rehnquist. One may believe that each
of those Justices faithfully applied the law as he understood it,
and yet their jurisprudential philosophies yielded starkly disparate, and predictable, votes in individual cases. Within the wide
range of judges who would faithfully interpret the law, surely the
public has a legitimate interest in encouraging the appointment
of one over another. Elections provide one means for states to
provide this aspect of prospective accountability.
Some proponents of judicial independence maintain that
permitting the public to influence even the initial choice of
judges creates problems in that it causes judges to prejudge cases
and/or causes them to be beholden to special interests that assist
the judge in gaining the appointment. As I've written at length
elsewhere, however, judges have views about cases whether or not
the public is permitted to know those views, 40 and interest groups
play a significant role in judicial appointments, as well as in
elections.4 1
In judging, as in everyday life, it is rhetorically beneficial to
claim "open-mindedness." Sophisticated defenders of judicial
independence, who understand the weakness of arguing that
judges must be independent because they merely apply law and
do not decide cases based on their own policy views, instead
claim that independence is necessary to ensure fairness to litigants.4" In the view of these commentators, parties appearing
before a judge should not have to go through the motions of
39. See TpRBE, supra note 35, at xi ("[Those who interpret and enforce
the Constitution simply cannot avoid choosing among competing social and
political visions, and.., those choices will reflect ourvalues.., only if we peer
closely enough, and probe deeply enough, into the outlooks of those whom our
Presidents name to sit on the Supreme Court.").
40. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe:
JudicialElections, the FirstAmendment, andJudges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 301, 340-42 (2003).
41. See Dimino, supra note 35, at 289-94.
42. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Straddling the Fence Between Truth and Pretense: The Role of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and the Future of
JudicialIndependence, 22 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 435, 447 (2008).
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making legal argument to convince somebody who has already
made up his mind.
A realistic assessment of the judicial process, however, would
recognize thatjudges often sit on cases presenting legal issues on
which the judge has made up his mind. We should want this to
be the case. Judges spend their careers, both before assuming the
bench and while in office, thinking about legal issues.4" Surely
they not only have general thoughts concerning legal topics but
have firm views on some legal questions. The judge who has
assumed the bench after spending a career in a prosecutor's or a
public defender's office should have a firm view as to the correctness of Miranda v. Arizona" and Mapp v. Ohio.4 5 The civil-rights
attorney-turnedjudge should have a firm view on Brown v. Board
of Education.4 6 And every lawyer should have a firm view on the
correctness of Marbury v. Madison's conclusion that federal courts
have the power of judicial review.4 7 Do we really want a judge to
be "impartial"-in the sense of open to persuasion-on the question whether a person can be convicted of treason on the testimony of fewer than two witnesses?4" And do we think that
appointing judges will make judges impartial in that sense?
Surely not.
Justices Brennan,4 9 Marshall,5 ° and Blackmun5 1 committed
themselves to reversing every capital sentence presented to them,
regardless of precedent or the facts of any individual case. That
commitment in death-penalty cases is perhaps the most famous
example of judicial closed-mindedness, but it is hardly unique.
Judges regularly issue opinions in which they announce their reasons for reaching a decision in a case, and in the process explain
how the law would be applied in other situations not presented
43. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (mem.) (recognizing
that by the time most judges ascend to the bench they have "formulated at least
some tentative notions which would influence them in their interpretation of
the sweeping clauses of the Constitution").
44. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179
(arguing that judicial review requires adherence to the provisions of the Constitution and explaining that, in the context of the treason question, "the language of the constitution [sic] is addressed especially to the courts ... [and]
prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from").
49. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J.,

concurring).
50. See id. at 358-60 (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (denying Petition for Certiorari).
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in the case at bar.5 2 Statements made extra-judicially-be it in a
commencement address, a campaign speech, or a confirmation
hearing-could not possibly evince any more of a commitment
than Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun made, and might
be considerably more equivocal. If those Justices were "impartial"
when they participated in death-penalty cases, then surely elections can co-exist with the requisite impartiality.5 3
In addition, it is worth remembering that whatever "impartial" means, litigants are guaranteed a judge who is actually
impartial, and not just a judge whose predispositions are
unknown. Thus, a judge who is inclined to view cases in line with
the positions of chambers of commerce or trial lawyers' associations will (or will not) be "partial" regardless of whether the candidate makes campaign statements or accepts contributions that
would associate himself with those groups.
Elections are potentially problematic from an impartiality
perspective only if the campaign process makes it more difficult to
reconsider statements one has made during the campaign, as
compared to the effect on the judge of other statements that may
have indicated his views on legal issues. Justice Stevens cited the
possibility for campaign statements to have this effect when he
argued in dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White that
judicial candidates could constitutionally be prohibited from
speaking their views on disputed legal or political issues: "Once
elected, he may feel free to disregard his campaign statements, .

.

. but that does not change the fact that the judge

announced his position on an issue likely to come before him as
a reason to vote for him."54 Even if one thinks that judges will be
faithful to such announcements for fear of electoral retribution,55 the effect can occur only in a regime providing for reelections. Without the looming threat of a vote, one's campaign
statements are no more binding than are any other statements
the judge has made about legal issues.
52.

See Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword to

CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT

BORK

COURT'S NOMINATION BATTLES

PAUL SIMON, ADvICE AND CONSENT:

AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME

13, 18 (1992).

53.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates
Are Unconstitutional,35 IND. L. REv. 735, 745 (2002) (making the same point

with regard to Justice Scalia's participation in abortion cases).
54. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 800 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. The majority did not. See id. at 780 (opinion of the Court) ("[O]ne
would be naive not to recognize that campaign promises are-by long democratic tradition-the least binding form of human commitment.").
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Likewise, campaign contributions are alleged to be influential not only because the judge might feel indebted to the contributor, but because the judge would fear that a similar
contribution to the judge's reelection campaign would be forthcoming only if the judge's decisions are to the contributor's liking. Eliminating reelections lessens the potentially pernicious
influence of campaign contributions. Further, if campaign
financing causes a problem of impartiality, there are alternatives
short of eliminating elections. Public financing systems, as seen
in North Carolina and as recommended in Wisconsin, would
accomplish the goal.
Thus, regardless of the system for selecting judges, those
judges will (and should) prejudge issues before those issues are
presented in actual cases, and judges who successfully assume the
bench will always be indebted to the politicians and interest
groups who facilitated the selection, whether the selection comes
as the result of a popular election or an appointment. More fundamentally, however, one might question whether the harm of
excluding the public from the policy-making process-prospectively, in the case of the judiciary-exceeds whatever harm might
be caused by including them. Those who seek to minimize public
influence in judicial selection need to demonstrate why openmindedness as to legal questions that should be open and shut is
such an important goal, and why-in an age of legal realism and
empirical study of judicial behavior-judicial policy making
should be immune from public influence. Bald assertions of
"due-process" rights5 6 will not suffice. 7
Appointments by public officials who themselves are decisionally accountable provide some of this prospective accountability, as we see in the national government. One may doubt,
56.

See, e.g.,'In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam)

("We firmly believe that the ability of judges to provide litigants due process
and due course of law is directly and unavoidably affected by the way in which
candidates campaign for judicial office."); Stephen B. Bright et al., Breaking the

Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 123 (1999); Max Minzner,
Gagged But Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules GoverningJudicial Campaign
Speech, 68 UMKC L. REv. 209, 228-31 (1999); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign
Speech: Restraint and Liberty in JudicialEthics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1060
(1996); Scott D. Wiener, Note, PopularJustice: StateJudicialElections and Procedural Due Process, 31 l-bxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187, 189 (1996); see also Ackerson v.
Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991)
(characterizing speech by judicial candidates as raising concerns about "fundamental fairness and impartiality").
57. See Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1993); Chemerinsky,
supra note 53, at 743-45; Dimino, supra note 40, at 333 nn.215-16, 338-46.
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however, whether appointments provide the same opportunity
for public input on the state level. Because state judges are not
given the same media attention as are federal nominees, especially nominees to the Supreme Court, it is possible for state officials to appoint judges with relatively extreme philosophies and
not trigger the kind of interest-group reaction that would accompany a similar appointment to the federal courts. Furthermore,
because legislators are rarely elected based on their judicial philosophies, it appears that judicial elections provide much more
of an opportunity for the public to focus on judges and make
known their desires for the appropriate judicial role than does a
process of action by the political branches in which those officials
act as proxies for the public.
II.

DIFFERENT

SELECTION SYSTEMS FOR DIFFERENT COURTS

States commonly select judges on different courts by different means. Ten states,5" out of the thirty-nine that hold some
elections for judges, select other judges by appointment.5 9 Curiously, however, states employing both elective and appointive systems uniformly appoint judges serving on high courts, and
reserve elections for low-level ones. This approach is exactly
backwards.
Elections are at their worst when applied to trial courts. The
electorate is ill-informed about the candidates, and pressure to
rule for a particular party is greatest for trial courts because of
the publicity surrounding a trial, and because a trial takes place
soon after the incident giving rise to it. More importantly, if a
trial court caves to political pressure, it is more likely to violate a
clear command of the law than would an appellate court that
reaches a decision based in part on political calculations because
trial courts typically have less discretion than do appellate courts.
One might think that holding elections for low-level courts
would enable voters to have a greater ability to become informed
about the candidates. Small districts mean that voters have a better chance of being personally acquainted with the candidates,6 °
and insofar as judicial decisions in local matters should be reflec58. Plus Maryland, which appoints its trial-court judges and then holds
contested elections for subsequent terms, and appoints its appellate judges
under the Missouri Plan.
59. See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, supra note 18, at 263-70. The figure
includes appellate judges and general-jurisdiction trial judges, and it ignores
the often varied methods states use to select judges of courts with limited
jurisdiction.
60. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, The Friends and Neighbors Effect in
Judicial Retention Elections, 40 W. POL. Q. 703, 707 (1987) (reporting that reten-
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tive of the community, it might make sense to permit the community to have input.
As it actually happens, however, voters do not know who the
candidates are in these elections, and there is little reason for
them to become informed. The more routine and less discretionary the business of the court, the less difference it makes who is
selected. Further, even where the choice ofjudge affects the outcome of litigation, voters will rarely have reason to believe those
outcomes will have a material effect on the voters' lives. As if that
were not enough reason for voters to remain rationally ignorant
about the candidates, there are often so many judgeships on a
ballot that becoming knowledgeable about the candidates would
take an unreasonable amount of time.6"
Further, because trial courts apply law that is more likely to
be settled than is the law applied by appellate courts, trial courts
have less freedom to accommodate the desires of the electorate
without breaking the law. Judges need to rule in unpopular ways.
Applying a principle of law to the benefit of an unpopular party,
or to the detriment of a popular one, is a fundamental requirement of the judicial function. Reelections, however, make such a
choice doubly difficult because the judge will be hampered not
only by his own feelings about the case but by electoral consequences as well.
Some have argued that the actual, potential, or perceived
influence of elections on judicial decisions should lead us to
eliminate all judicial elections, if not as a requirement of due
process, then as a matter of wise policy.6 2 And certainly judges at
all levels have law that binds, or is supposed to bind, them no
matter what the judges' or the public's preferences are. Nevertheless, the differences between trial courts' responsibilities and
those of appellate courts-particularly the highest courts of the
states-are significant.
It is those high courts whose decisions impact the most people and set policy to be applied by the rest of the judicial hierarchy. Further, it is often the high courts for whom the law has not
provided a clear result in the case under review. Therefore, pubtion-election voters in judges' home counties are more likely to vote than are
out-of-county voters).
61. See Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83
JUDIcATURE 79, 81 (1999) ("There is also some evidence that voters fail to differ-

entiate among judges on the same ballot. For example, judges in the same district received very similar proportions of affirmative votes."); Reddick, supra
note 20, at 735 (citing William K Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of
Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 346 (1987)).
62. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 21, at 58-72.
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lic involvement in judicial policy might be able to help shape the
law in a manner consistent with society's goals rather than with
the judges'.
State high courts are accountable within the judiciary to only
the Supreme Court of the United States, and even there only as
to matters of federal law.6" No decisional law of the state binds
state supreme courts, for they can overrule even their own past
decisions, and they have the discretion to reach different conclusions than federal district courts and courts of appeals as to matters of federal law. To be sure, statutory law and precedent from
the U.S. Supreme Court can place considerable constraints on
judges of state supreme courts (as, incidentally, state courts' decisions place constraints on the Supreme Court),64 but where such
courts' dockets are discretionary, it is unlikely that they will take a
case unless reasonable jurists could disagree as to the meaning of
the law. Thus, the most sympathetic case for judicial independence-the judge who is punished at the polls for performing
his job in the only way faithful to the law-is rarely present when
considering elections for state supreme courts.
State supreme courts are even more clearly able to exercise
their discretion in making policy than is the Supreme Court of
the United States. No one would seriously dispute the proposition that the members of that Court make policy when they give
effect to the broad terms in the Constitution and federal statutes.6 5 State supreme courts have similar authority in interpreting state constitutions and statutes.6 6
63. See generally RicHARD H. FALLON,JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 466-541 (5th ed. 2003).
64. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state
shall be declared by its Legislature or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern."); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590 (1874) (limiting the U.S. Supreme Court's power to reverse the decisions
of any state's highest court on matters of state law).
65. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (describing the Supreme

Court as a "political institution"); Dimino, supra note 35, at 277-78 ("Anyone
who has been the least bit attuned to the development of public policy over the
last fifty years is well aware that massive changes in our nation's approach to
problems involving race, criminal justice, family relations and sexual intimacy,
tort liability, religion, education, and elections, just to name a few areas, have
come about through the actions of courts." (footnotes omitted)).
66. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002)
("Not only do state-court judges possess the power to 'make' common law, but
they have the immense power to shape the States' constitutions as well. Which is
precisely why the election of state judges became popular." (citation omitted)).
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Whereas, however, in the federal courts, "with a qualification so small it does not bear mentioning, there is no such thing
as common law,"6 7 state courts regularly apply the common law
to fields-contracts, property, and torts-having significant
impacts on citizens' daily lives. Except where the state legislatures
have acted to strip the courts of common-law authority, state
courts retain the power, not just to interpret the law made by
other branches of government, but to make the law themselves.
It has even been suggested that state courts should take a greater,
more activist, role in construing legislation because their experience68 with the common law has accustomed them to shaping the
law.
This greater policy-making authority held by state supreme
courts makes it all the more vital that their actions be subject to
some popular control.6 9 The justification for independence is to
ensure the ability to apply the law; the justification for all elections-legislative and executive, as well as judicial-is to ensure
that lawmakers have the requisite connection to the sovereign
authority in a democratic republic: the people.7"
Voters in today's judicial elections do not know much about
any of the candidates, including those running for seats on high
courts. Nevertheless, because there are few seats on states' highest courts, the number of elections and candidates will be small.
Accordingly, it will be possible for voters to become informed.
Particularly if the ballot is not crowded with lower-court races,
voters would be able to focus their attention on the small number of high-court candidates.
Furthermore, the current ignorance of voters may be due in
large part to limitations on the speech of judicial candidates. In
2002, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 7 the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional the most restrictive of these regulations, the "announce clause," which prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political
67. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpretingthe Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER
OF INTERPRETATION 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
68. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common
Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 18-34 (1995).
69. Cf TERRIJENNINGS PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999).
Peretti argues that "value-voting and political motive [are] both necessary and
legitimate ingredients in constitutional decisionmaking .... " Id. at 77.
70. Cf U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States . .. do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 15, at 468 ("[T]he power
of the people is superior to both [the judicial and the legislative power] ...
71.
White, 536 U.S. 765.
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issues. However, several other restrictions, whose constitutionality has been challenged in lower courts, remain on the books.
Some of those restrictions prohibit candidates from making
"pledges or promises of conduct in office '7 2 and from making
statements that "commit or appear to commit the candidate" to
"issues that are likely to come before the court."7 3 If elections are
defective because of the ignorance of voters, such ignorance is
not necessarily the voters' fault. States may or may not decide
that elections are an appropriate method of judicial selection.
But it straw-mans the argument to complain about the voters'
inability to select good candidates when the voting scheme itself
makes it difficult for voters to become informed.
Appointments display the opposite set of advantages and disadvantages. Removing the public from the direct involvement in
judicial selection can permit trial judges the freedom to render
unpopular rulings in individual cases, but removing the public
from the selection of high-court judges invites policy making by
officials who hold views the public does not support. Limiting
elections to high-courts, however, capitalizes on the comparative
advantage of appointments in permitting elites to identify qualified potential judges unknown to the general public, while also
taking advantage of elections' comparative advantage in permitting the public to influence the institutions most involved in policy making.
CONCLUSION

Defenders ofjudicial independence concede that, "[i] nsofar
as judges abuse their independence by implementing their political or class agendas instead of adhering to the law, it would seem
that the time has come to rethink, in a fundamental way, the
need for their independence,"7 4 though they deny the truth of
the statement's major premise. Still, such concessions do not go
far enough.
Such statements imply a false dichotomy between "adhering
to the law" and "implementing political or class agendas," and
72. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3) (d) (i) (2000).
73. Id. at Canon 5A(3) (d) (ii).
74. GEYH, supra note 32, at 263; see also id. at 279 ("If, as postrealists insist,
independent judges ignore the rule of law and implement their own policy
predilections, judicial independence loses its raison d'etre and simply liberates
unelected judicial elites to trump the majority's political preferences with their
own."); id. at 281 ("If we ultimately conclude that judges employ law as a shill to
conceal nakedly political decision making of a sort best reserved for Congress
or the people, then insulating such decision making from the influence of Congress or the people becomes largely indefensible ....").
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therefore do not address that vast area of appellate judging in
which the correct answer is not clear, and judges with different
political inclinations will reach different results though each
judge is "adhering to the law." The public has an interest in shaping those results, and selecting appellate judges initially by election is one way of satisfying that interest without unduly
undermining the decisional independence that underlies judicial review and the rule of law.

